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1.  INTRODUCTION
The maize-oriented agricultural economies throughout Southern Africa are in fundamental
transition.  Increased recognition of the costs of historical controls on pricing and marketing
already has led to partial maize market liberalization in several countries in the region. 
However, there is still intense debate over the appropriate scope and implementation of future
food market reform.  Much of the debate derives from uncertainty over the consequences of
comprehensive and politically risky changes to domestic markets, especially at a time when
regional market conditions are also in flux due to agricultural restructuring in neighboring
countries.  There is currently little information on the direction and magnitude of grain trade
between South Africa, Zimbabwe, and other countries in the region under a deregulated external
trading environment.  There is also a lack of information on the regional consequences of
alternative domestic maize policy scenarios currently under deliberation in South Africa.
The purpose of this research is fourfold.  First, we consider the role of food market reform in
affecting future economic growth and food security in South Africa, and discuss the congruence
between the government's food policy objectives and the existing marketing and pricing system. 
Second, trends in maize production, trade, prices and marketing costs in South Africa and
Zimbabwe, the two largest maize traders in the region, are presented.  Third, we present four
alternative maize policy scenarios in South Africa, and then estimate their effects on maize
production, gross revenues, consumer prices, and trade flows under various weather and pricing
scenarios in Zimbabwe.  A comparison of results across four policy scenarios clarifies the
gainers, losers, and extent of income transfers between various regions and socio-economic
groups within each region.  The final section identifies means by which national food policy
objectives in South Africa may be more cost-effectively achieved through harmonization of
policies between South Africa and its regional neighbors.
Four policy scenarios are examined:  (1) the existing system of government-controlled maize
prices in South Africa and Zimbabwe; (2) deregulated maize trade within South Africa, under a
range of controlled price levels in Zimbabwe; (3) deregulated maize trade within and between
South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the world market; and (4) a protected regional market, i.e.,
Scenario 3 with alternative tariff levels on imported yellow maize from the world market.
The study's findings are based on an econometrically-parameterized spatial equilibrium model. 
The model includes 13 geographic regions:  Western Cape, Northern Cape, Orange Free State,
Eastern Cape, KwaZulu/Natal, Eastern Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, Gauteng (former PWV),
Northwest; Zimbabwe (commercial farming sector); Zimbabwe (smallholder sector); other
major maize producing countries in the SADC region (Mozambique, Botswana, Malawi, and
Zambia); and the world market.     
1In South Africa, Vink (1993) highlights the importance of agriculture's backward and forward linkages to the
broader economy.
     
2Labor productivity is also determined by skill levels (in addition to labor costs), but this aspect is less directly
affected by agricultural policy.
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2.  THE ROLE OF MAIZE POLICY REFORM IN AFFECTING FUTURE
 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOOD SECURITY
History indicates that the development process in most regions of the world has occurred
through structural transformation (Johnston and Mellor 1961; Mellor 1976; Staatz 1994). 
Structural transformation involves a process of increased specialization of labor, a transition
from subsistence production to exchange-based economies, and a relative shift in resources from
farm to non-farm sectors.  Structural transformation is typically driven by technical change and
institutional innovation in the food system, thereby raising labor productivity, real wages, and
incomes.  Because 12 million of South Africa's 16 million people living under the poverty line
are in rural areas, most of whom are engaged in agriculture, productivity growth in agriculture is
likely to be a precondition for injecting purchasing power into rural areas and hence stimulating
demand and employment growth in the broader economy.  The empirical record of Europe and
Asia convincingly demonstrates the importance of agricultural growth in stimulating broad-
based rural income growth and economic transformation (e.g., Johnston 1951; Ashton and
Mingay 1965; Mellor 1973).
1
A related process, involving the relationship between the price of staple wage goods and
economic growth, also has been observed throughout the world, starting with Ricardo in early
19th century England.  One of the most important ways of transferring resources inter-sectorally
is to reduce the price of food relative to non-agricultural products through productivity growth in
the food system (Mellor 1973; Timmer 1988; Staatz 1994).  A fall in consumer food prices
relative to other goods has the effect of transferring resources from the food system to other
parts of the economy, as it now takes fewer resources from the non-food sectors to buy a unit of
food.  This allows industrial firms to hold down money wages, making their firms more
profitable and competitive internationally (Staatz 1994; Delgado 1992).
2  However, there is a
major difference whether a decline in real food prices are achieved through cost-reducing
productivity growth or through taxation of farmers (Binswanger 1994; Schiff and Valdes 1992).
Beside these indirect effects of food prices on employment and income growth, consumer food
prices directly affect the level of food security and disposable incomes of the poor.
Food policy reform in Southern Africa is likely to critically affect both of these economy-wide
processes:  the degree of intersectoral income transfers, and the cost of food/industrial
competitiveness relationship.  Given the importance of maize in human diets, farm incomes, and
agro-industries in Southern Africa, maize market reform has the potential to affect (a) consumer
food prices, and therefore the real incomes of South Africa's 16 million people living in poverty;3
(b) the extent of decentralization and de-concentration in the food system, with implications for
patterns of investment and economic growth; (c) future surplus maize production levels over and
above domestic demand, which would affect rural/urban terms of trade; (d) incentives for private
firms to develop viable input delivery systems to black smallholder areas, thus affecting future
production costs and agricultural viability in these areas; and (e) regional comparative advantage
and potential gains from trade in Southern Africa.  For these reasons, maize policy reform in
Southern Africa has importance far beyond the food sector; it is likely to be a determinant of
future economic growth and food security throughout the region (Groenewald 1991).
2.1. Policy Objectives and Current Maize Marketing Systems:  A Means-Ends
Consistency?
The objectives of agricultural policy typically involve:  (1) income growth for farmers
(especially those with political representation); (2) food security for consumers; (3) food price
and supply stability; (4) the minimization of treasury outlays arising from government maize
marketing activities; and (5) environmental sustainability.  There are obvious trade-offs between
these objectives.  The political power of various stakeholders has greatly influenced how these
trade-offs have been resolved.
Before 1980, the structure of maize marketing and pricing was remarkably similar in South
Africa and Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia).  An elaborate system of trading regulations
were instituted to protect European farmers from the competition from African farmers.  State
marketing boards (i.e., the Maize Board and Grain Marketing Board in South Africa and
Zimbabwe, respectively) were designed to provide assured market outlets for mainly European
farmers at stable prices generally held above export parity levels.  This relatively high-price
policy generated surplus production in both countries and trading losses on exports.  The system
of controls blocked potentially profitable trade between African farmers and mines, livestock
operations, commercial farms and urban consumers.  Because of these controls, surplus
production in communal areas was channeled by default to the Board or its agents, which offered
considerably lower prices relative to European farmers.  This differential pricing structure was
used, primarily in Southern Rhodesia to partially offset the trading account losses associated
with setting prices to European farmers that were too high to break even on exports (Keyter
1975).
Once in the hands of the Boards or their agents, maize was normally transported onward to a
small group of industrial millers and animal feeders.  These large-scale buyers became, by
regulation, vertically linked to the Boards; procurement of maize from other sources was illegal. 
At the same time, unlicensed or "informal" traders and millers were typically restricted from
procuring maize from the Boards.  The combination of movement controls and selective access
to the Boards' maize stocks effectively reserved the bulk of the white maize in both countries for
the industrial millers, distributors, and retailers in the official marketing channel and
consequently assured their oligopolistic position in the maize meal market.  Thus, as in much of
Eastern and Southern Africa, grain marketing in South Africa and (prior to 1992) Zimbabwe had     
3In 1993/94, GMB's budget deficit amounted to 5% of national GDP.
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been dominated by a single-channel flow of grain from rural areas into the state/urban milling
system, providing preferential access to selected buyers and impeding the development of a
more decentralized and lower-cost system (Jayne and Chisvo 1991; Groenewald 1991; van Zyl
and Kirsten 1992; Jayne, Takavarasha, and van Zyl 1994).
Upon independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government rapidly expanded market outlets for
surplus grain production in smallholder areas.  Smallholder output rose dramatically, but this
was confined mainly to the high-potential Mashonaland maize belt (Amin 1990).  The structure
of the market had changed little in terms of improving access to grain in urban and grain-deficit
rural areas until 1992, when controls on informal maize trade were relaxed and then eliminated
in 1993.  Large subsidies on maize meal distributed through the industrial milling system were
also abolished.  Within one year, these policy changes have induced a large shift in urban maize
consumption patterns, from the refined meal produced and distributed through the official
marketing channel to the less-refined and less expensive whole meal produced by informal
small-scale millers (Rubey 1993).
Zimbabwe's Grain Marketing Board (GMB) continues to set uniform prices that do not vary
within the marketing year or across regions.  This supports farm incomes in maize surplus areas
facing high transport costs to urban markets (mainly smallholders in the Mashonaland and
Midlands areas).  Yet the GMB's status of residual buyer offering fixed buying and selling prices
does not allow the Board to respond to changes in market conditions.  To the extent that GMB
prices exceed those in parallel channels, the Board bids away grain from informal trading
channels and incurs large losses associated with surplus stocks.
3  When GMB prices are lower
than informal market prices, GMB intake will fall, causing difficulty for the Board to defend its
selling prices without importing and releasing sufficient grain onto the market to drive down
prices to the desired level.  Past experience also indicates that this is a costly undertaking.  Some
commentators have stated that Zimbabwe's uniform pricing and associated supply management
policies represent the "cost of food security."  Evidence suggests, however, that these policies
are not the least costly means of achieving food security (Masters and Nuppenau 1993).
In South Africa, private maize trade is still heavily regulated by the Government.  Since 1987,
the system effectively operates as a single channel pooling scheme.  The Government sets the
price at which maize will sell in domestic markets.  Prices differ between various "market
segments," i.e., the human market, the animal market, the industrial market, and the international
market, in order to achieve the objective of maximizing revenue (price times volume) in the
long-term" (Willemse et al 1994, p. 10).  Producer payouts are determined by subtracting the
Board's operating costs from the Board's sales revenue.  In this way, the system is designed to
avoid treasury losses associated with state maize trading.  While this pricing mechanism has
depressed real producer prices since 1987, it is widely believed that the system still transfers
income from low-income black consumers to white commercial farmers (Groenewald 1991;
Meyer and van Zyl 1992; Wright and Nieuwoudt 1993).     
4Typically through stockholding operations to defend fixed buying and selling prices.
     
5A lengthy presentation of these political, social and economic reasons can be found in Jones (1994).
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Maize processing and retailing in South Africa is still dominated by an oligopoly of large-scale,
vertically-linked private firms.  However, recent relaxation of licensing has increased the market
share of small-scale millers in South Africa to about 10%.
An important difference in the market structure of South Africa and Zimbabwe is the scale and
sophistication of private maize trading firms.  This difference is largely attributed to policy. 
South Africa's Maize Board has primarily served as a coordinator and director of maize
movement and pricing, leaving the physical distribution and storage activities to private firms
(although still controlled by the Maize Board), whereas Zimbabwe's Grain Marketing Board
(GMB) historically has performed all of these functions directly.
The major stakeholders in maize market reform are:
(a) governments, concerned primarily with the effects of reform on political support from
various socio-economic groups and their ability to retain influence over strategic factors such as
price levels; (b) taxpayers, comprised of a quite narrow base in both South Africa and
Zimbabwe; (c) commercial large-scale farmers; (d) smallholder farmers; (e) urban consumers;
(f) rural households dependent on the market for maize; (g) the state marketing boards; (h)
private firms involved in maize storage and distribution; (i) animal feeders; (j) large-scale maize
processors, wholesalers, and retailers involved in the milling and distribution of maize meal
through the official marketing channel; and (k) small-scale or informal traders and millers
outside of the official marketing system.
The raison d'etre of marketing boards has always been, and continues to be, an instrument of
governments for transferring incomes to particular groups, and for promoting economic and
political stability.  In South Africa, the transfer has been from consumers (and taxpayers, prior to
1987) to commercial farmers, but this may change given a different ranking of priorities within
the new Government.  In Zimbabwe, government's primary concern is over the tradeoff between
state deficit reduction and the protection of smallholder maize sellers' interests.  The central
problem is that the current and unsustainably large GMB trading deficit (5% of GDP in 1993/94)
is largely a result of a high-priced and pan-territorial pricing policy that, while serving the
interests of smallholder maize sellers far from urban demand centers, is often inconsistent with
underlying market conditions and contains no mechanism for the GMB to flexibly respond to
these conditions (GMB 1991).  In both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the landlocked position of
many urban centers and the thinness of the international white maize market have elevated
governments' concern over maize price stability and the preservation of state marketing boards
in order to operationalize this objective.
4  There are compelling economic, social and political
reasons for continued price stability, and an important task for government is to determine how
to continue this -- to some degree -- in a financially sustainable way.
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The relative power and influence of these stakeholders differs across countries.  For example, the
interests of black smallholders have been incorporated more fully into maize policy in
Zimbabwe over the past decade compared to South Africa, resulting in different pressures on the
evolution of maize policy reform.  In both countries, a relatively small but well-represented
group of smallholder farmers (5% of the total) receive most of state expenditure on maize
purchases from the smallholder sector (Table 1).  These farmers count on the continued
provision of close market outlets that the Boards currently provide, and oppose any withdrawal
of those benefits.  These benefits are responsible for much of the GMB's deficits under the
current pricing policy.  The smallholder farm lobby group in Zimbabwe is actually dominated
by large-scale African farmers, whose interests tend to dominate over the much larger group of
food-deficit smallholders who are most likely hurt by higher maize prices (Jayne and Rukuni
1993).  Most smallholders in both countries sell little or no maize.
2.2. Food Self-Sufficiency vs. Food Self-Reliance
Most states in Southern Africa have pursued a policy of food self-sufficiency.  Food self-
sufficiency involves meeting domestic demand through production and stockholding.  Food self-
reliance involves meeting a country's requirements through a combination of production, stocks,
and trade, with the mix depending on the relative costs of procurement from each source.
A fundamental issue guiding the management of a national food economy is identifying the least
costly way to secure national food requirements.  Food self-sufficiency is beneficial to farmers,
consumers, and the government treasury alike if it can be achieved at prices below import parity
levels and surplus production can be exported without a loss.  To the extent, however, that
consumers can acquire maize more cheaply from other sources, or exports must be underwritten
by the government, self-sufficiency imposes costs on consumers and/or taxpayers, and in some
cases, even farmers (e.g., animal producers, farms with large labor requirements, and most
importantly, smallholders who are net food buyers).
On the surface, the pursuit of maize self-sufficiency in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the
associated controls on food pricing and trade, appears to have reflected the interests of selected
farmers at the expense of consumers (Mosley 1983; Wright and Nieuwoudt 1993; Jayne and
Rukuni 1993; Groenewald 1991).  This is especially true where imports could supply a particular
area more cheaply than domestic production.  Prices in South Africa,especially in the coastal
regions, have clearly been driven up beyond those that would prevail if import controls were
relaxed (NAMPO 1994).  In the case of Zimbabwe, Jayne and Rukuni (1993) found that a policy
of food self-reliance, involving a relatively small amount of imports, would have reduced the
cost of maize to consumers by 1% to 16%, depending on the weather, compared to a pricing
policy geared consistently to achieve food self-sufficiency.
Yet these findings, while important, do not necessarily mean that the pursuit of food self-
sufficiency is misguided, because of potential dynamic linkages between domestic food
production growth and non-farm sectors.  As mentioned earlier, because most of the rural poor7
are engaged in agriculture, stimulating rural incomes through agricultural growth is likely to fuel
the demand for agricultural wage labor and for goods in non-farm sectors.  Yet there is a major
difference whether such agricultural growth occurs through new technology and increased
productivity, or through protecting farmers from external competition.
The magnitude of growth linkages also depends on the skewness of productive resources in rural
areas, because the potential of money to be widely recycled through the economy depends in
part on how narrowly concentrated the first round of beneficiaries of a direct income effect
would be.  South Africa's agricultural system is highly concentrated.  About 60,000 white
farmers own 85% of the country's arable land, while one million black smallholders farm 15%
of the land and produce mainly for subsistence.  It is estimated that 12,000 white farmers
produce almost 80% of the total agricultural output (Louw 1990).  Even in the former homeland
areas, black agricultural production is equally skewed (van Zyl and Kirsten 1992), and rural
black households are increasingly dependent on externally-produced food supplies.
In Zimbabwe, rural resources are equally skewed.  One percent of the African smallholder farms
received 48% of the revenue paid by the state to smallholders for maize purchases (Table 1). 
One percent of all farms in the country (including European commercial farms) received 70% of
the state's outlays on maize purchases (Jayne and Rukuni 1993).  Evidence in both countries
indicate that most rural smallholder households in both South Africa and Zimbabwe are net
buyers of food (Stack and Chopak 1990; Jayne and Chisvo 1991; Hedden-Dunkhorst 1990;
Dankwa 1992; Kirsten and Sartorius von Bach 1992).  A skewed concentration of resource
ownership and marketing grain output is typical throughout Africa, though generally to a lesser
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6Although higher maize prices could, other things equal, contribute to the incomes of low-income smallholders
by stimulating the demand for agricultural wage labor, household survey data indicates that wage labor income is
marginal for most smallholder families in both South Africa and Zimbabwe (see Sartorius von Bach, Kirsten, and
van Zyl 1994; Stack and Chopak 1990).
     
7See Staatz (1994) for a concise synthesis.
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Two major conclusions may be drawn from these findings.  First, maize pricing policy in South
Africa and Zimbabwe have extremely concentrated direct benefits.  Most rural smallholders
derive little or no direct benefit from higher maize prices.
6  Second, many farm households, as
well as urban consumers, are directly hurt by higher maize prices, at least in the short run. 
Given the skewed concentration of assets among the rural sector, and without a major
redistribution of productive resources in rural areas, it is doubtful that the objective of broad-
based rural income growth is compatible with the historical practice of holding maize prices at
or above import parity levels (Kirsten and Sartorius von Bach 1992).
This point should not be construed as an argument for altering the rural-urban terms of trade
against agriculture.  This strategy, pursued in much of Africa through controlled marketing
systems during the 1970s and 1980s, has strongly depressed household food security in these
countries (World Bank 1981; Schiff and Valdes 1992).  However, the opposite approach of
raising farm prices above market levels has led to the same result in South Africa.  Empirical
results elsewhere indicate that in countries characterized by a large gap between import and
export parity (such as Zimbabwe and South Africa), high food prices drive up wage costs and
the real exchange rate, making these countries less competitive in international trade and slowing
overall economic growth by raising production costs in the non-agricultural sectors.  Examples
of this Ricardian "food bottleneck" have been documented by authors such as Mellor (1976) and
Delgado (1992) to analysis of growth strategies in India and the Sahel.
7  Because of important
backward and forward linkages, the price of maize undoubtedly influences the general level of
prices in the economies of much of Southern Africa (Blackie 1987).  Efforts to reduce the cost
of procuring national food requirements could help increase disposable income in urban and
grain-deficit rural areas and also promote competitiveness in labor-intensive non-farm sectors of
the economy (Delgado 1992; Reardon, Delgado, and Matlon 1992).  While these general-
equilibrium concepts are not formally modelled below, we stress their importance in the
development of appropriate maize marketing policies in the region.
The trade-offs between domestic production incentives and food affordability may be relieved
by measures to reduce food production and marketing costs and increase incomes.  Over the long
run, this requires sustained support for input and credit delivery systems, agricultural research
and extension to generate and disseminate new technology, efficient product distribution and
processing systems, and in some cases, a reallocation of productive resources.  But all of these
will be critically affected by policies on pricing, infrastructure, and technology, which, over
time, alter income distribution, effective demand, and household food security.  As observed by
Johnston and Mellor over three decades ago (1961), economic growth is constrained by a
skewed income distribution.  The skewed distribution of assets and productive potential among10
the rural population in many African countries underscores the need for a clearer understanding
of how agricultural pricing and trade policies may be re-designed to stimulate broad-based rural
income growth.11
3.  MAJOR TRENDS IN THE MAIZE SECTORS
3.1. Production and Trade Trends
South Africa and Zimbabwe are the largest producers of maize in the Southern Africa region
(Table 2).  However, South Africa typically produces more maize (including yellow) than the
combined production of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi,
Botswana, and Namibia.  Hence, policy reforms with non-marginal effects on domestic market
conditions in South Africa are likely to influence food market conditions and/or government
treasury outlays in the rest of the region, given a freer external trade regime.
Market restructuring in Zimbabwe and Zambia may alter food market conditions in the smaller
countries in the region, but would be expected to have only moderate effects on the South
African market.  Marketed maize output in Zimbabwe and Zambia combined amounts to about
20% to 30% of marketed maize output in South Africa.  When considering white maize only,
this figure rises to 35%-45%. 
Maize production has been stagnant or declining over the 1982/83-1993/94 period in all of the
countries listed in Table 2.  In per capita terms, maize production has been declining in all
countries.  This has been deliberate in South Africa since 1987, and in Zimbabwe during the late
1980s, due in both cases to surplus production and subsequent export losses.  Yet in the other
countries, falling per capita production represents increasing reliance on South Africa,
Zimbabwe, and the limited supplies of white maize on international markets, for residual white
maize requirements.
In both South Africa and Zimbabwe, maize yields have been stagnant over the last quarter-
century, with the exception of Zimbabwe's smallholder sector between 1980 and 1985 (Figure
1).  Linear time trends regressed on a five-year centered moving average of maize yields were
statistically insignificant over the 1972-1993 period for Zimbabwe's large-scale commercial
sector and for all nine regions of South Africa.  However, input use per hectare has declined in
commercial maize production in both South Africa and Zimbabwe since the early 1980s, and
hence total factor productivity of maize production may well have risen (Thirtle et al. 1993a;
1993b).
In Zimbabwe's smallholder sector, the moving average of yields grew at an average annual rate
of 76 kgs/hectare from 1979-1986 (significant at the 5% level), but the trend has since reached a
plateau.  Fertilizer use among smallholders has declined since 1986, and the hybrid seed
varieties currently used by most smallholders are almost 20 years old.  Total factor productivity
of smallholder maize production has stagnated since 1985 (Jayne et al. 1994).Table 2.  Maize Production and Net Exports, 1982/83-1993/94, Selected Southern African Countries
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1RWHV￿
￿<HDU DUH PDUNHWLQJ \HDUV ￿$SULO WKURXJK 0DUFK￿ H[FHSW IRU 6RXWK $IULFD￿ ZKLFK LV 0D\ WKURXJK $SULO￿￿ SURGXFWLRQ RFFXUV LQ WKH ILUVW \HDU RI WKH
VSOLW \HDU￿
￿$OPRVW HQWLUHO\ ZKLWH PDL]H￿ (VWLPDWHV DUH GUDZQ IURP YDULRXV GDWD VRXUFHV ￿EHORZ￿￿ XVLQJ GLIIHUHQW HVWLPDWLRQ PHWKRGV￿
￿ ([SRUWV IRU 6RXWK
$IULFD LQFOXGH VDOHV WR &XVWRPV 8QLRQ PHPEHUV￿ %RWVZDQD￿ /HVRWKR￿ 6ZD]LODQG￿ DQG 1DPLELD￿ DV ZHOO DV WR WKH LQGHSHQGHQW %ODFN VWDWHV￿ ’XULQJ WKH \HDUV
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ DQG ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ WKHUH ZHUH QR H[SRUWV RXWVLGH WKH &XVWRPV 8QLRQ￿ 6RXWK $IULFD H[SRUWV DQG LPSRUWV ERWK ZKLWH DQG \HOORZ PDL]H JUDLQ DQG
SURGXFWV￿ ￿6ZD]LODQG SURGXFWLRQ DQG LPSRUW GDWD GRHV QRW GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ ZKLWH DQG \HOORZ PDL]H￿ DOWKRXJK PRVW PDL]H SURGXFHG RU LPSRUWHG LQ WKH
FRXQWU\ KDV EHHQ ZKLWH￿
6RXUFHV￿ 6ZD]LODQG￿ (FRQRPLF 3ODQQLQJ 2IILFH￿ 0LQLVWU\ RI (FRQRPLF 3ODQQLQJ DQG ’HYHORSPHQW ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’HYHORSPHQW 3ODQ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
0EDEDQH￿ DQG (DUO\ :DUQLQJ 8QLW RI WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI $JULFXOWXUH DQG &RRSHUDWLYHV GDWDEDVH IRU ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ GDWD￿ 6RXWK $IULFD￿ 0DL]H %RDUG ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0DL]H
%RDUG $QQXDO 5HSRUW ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $UFDGLD￿ 3UHWRULD￿ DQG 86 (PEDVV\ XQSXEOLVKHG GDWD IRU ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0R]DPELTXH ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ )$2
$JURVWDW ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ FRPSXWHU GDWDEDVH￿ SURYLVLRQDO GDWD￿ 0R]DPELTXH ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0LQLVWU\ RI &RPPHUFH￿ ’6$ %XOOHWLQV￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ =DPELD￿
+RZDUG ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ =LPEDEZH￿ $JULWH[￿)$2 (DUO\ :DUQLQJ 8QLW￿ 0LQLVWU\ RI /DQG￿ $JULFXOWXUH￿ DQG :DWHU ’HYHORSPHQW￿ *RYHUQPHQW RI =LPEDEZH￿
+DUDUH IRU WKH SURGXFWLRQ GDWD ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ &RPPHUFLDO )DUPHUV 8QLRQ GDWD ILOHV￿ +DUDUH￿ IRU WKH \HOORZ PDL]H SURGXFWLRQ GDWD￿ &HQWUDO 6WDWLVWLFV 2IILFH￿
0LQLVWU\ RI )LQDQFH￿ GDWD ILOHV￿ +DUDUH IRU WKH \HOORZ PDL]H SURGXFWLRQ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ DQG *UDLQ 0DUNHWLQJ %RDUG￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $QQXDO 5HSRUW ￿￿￿￿￿ +DUDUH IRU
LPSRUW DQG H[SRUW GDWD￿     
8Historically, this has been least true of South Africa, but is likely to become more common due to the current
structural reduction in maize production, and apparent climatic change in the Southern Africa region (Magadza
1994).
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)LJXUH ￿￿ <LHOG 7UHQGV IRU :KLWH 0DL]H￿ 6RXWK $IULFD DQG =LPEDEZH￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ 0DL]H <LHOG &RUUHODWLRQV
2QH LPSRUWDQW LQGLFDWRU RI WKH SRWHQWLDO IRU PXWXDOO\ EHQHILFLDO PDL]H WUDGH LQ WKH UHJLRQ LV WKH
GHJUHH RI FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ PDL]H \LHOGV LQ WKH PDMRU SURGXFWLRQ DUHDV￿ 0RVW RI WKH \HDU￿
WR￿\HDU SURGXFWLRQ YDULDELOLW\ LQ ERWK 6RXWK $IULFD DQG =LPEDEZH LV GXH WR IOXFWXDWLRQV LQ
\LHOGV DV RSSRVHG WR DUHD SODQWHG￿ 0RUHRYHU￿ WKH PDMRU DFWRUV LQ WKH UHJLRQ ￿6RXWK $IULFD￿
=LPEDEZH￿ DQG =DPELD￿ GR QRW DOZD\V SURGXFH D VXUSOXV￿ EXW WHQG WR IOXFWXDWH IURP QHW
H[SRUWHU WR QHW LPSRUWHU GHSHQGLQJ RQ UDLQIDOO￿
￿ $ SRVLWLYH FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH PDMRU
SURGXFWLRQ UHJLRQV ZRXOG LQGLFDWH VLPLODULW\ RI ZHDWKHU SDWWHUQV￿ DQG UDLVH WKH SUREDELOLW\ WKDW
FRXQWULHV ZRXOG H[SHULHQFH VXUSOXVHV RU GHILFLWV DW WKH VDPH WLPH￿ 6XFK D ILQGLQJ ZRXOG￿
FHWHULV SDULEXV￿ UHGXFH WKH SRWHQWLDO IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI D GXUDEOH￿ FRQVLVWHQW SDWWHUQ RI
UHJLRQDO PDL]H WUDGH￿ 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG￿ D ORZ RU QHJDWLYH FRUUHODWLRQ RI PDL]H \LHOGV DPRQJ
PDMRU SURGXFWLRQ UHJLRQV ZRXOG LQGLFDWH WKDW GHILFLWV LQ RQH DUHD PLJKW EH ILOOHG E\ VXUSOXV
SURGXFWLRQ LQ RWKHU FRXQWULHV￿     
9Because of a general absence of common yield trends over the sample period, taking correlation coefficients
of the first differences in yields gave essentially the same results.
     
10Markets and other forms of exchange (from which costs are derived) do not exist without rules to set the
framework for exchange and to determine what gets counted as a cost (see Bromley 1993; Schmid 1992; Samuels
1992).
     
11Official exchange rates are used to examine potential trading incentives under the prevailing macroeconomic
policy regimes in the two countries.  Further analysis is necessary to examine the implications of less regulated
exchange rate regimes in the region.
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7DEOH ￿ SUHVHQWV WKH FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQWV EHWZHHQ PDMRU PDL]H SURGXFWLRQ DUHDV LQ WKH
UHJLRQ RYHU WKH SHULRG ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0DL]H \LHOGV DUH SRVLWLYHO\ DQG KLJKO\ FRUUHODWHG LQ WKH
UHJLRQ￿ $PRQJ WKH PDMRU SURGXFLQJ UHJLRQV ￿2UDQJH )UHH 6WDWH￿ (DVWHUQ 7UDQVYDDO￿
1RUWKZHVW￿ =LPEDEZH FRPPHUFLDO￿ =LPEDEZH VPDOOKROGHU￿ DQG =DPELD VPDOOKROGHU￿￿ WKH
ORZHVW FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW DPRQJ DQ\ SDUWLFXODU SDLU ZDV ￿￿￿￿￿ ZKLOH WKH DYHUDJH
FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW ZDV ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 7KHVH UHVXOWV VXJJHVW WKDW WKH DELOLW\ RI UHJLRQDO WUDGH WR
VWDELOL]H UHJLRQDO VXSSOLHV DQG FRQVXPSWLRQ LV OLPLWHG E\ UDWKHU VLPLODU ZHDWKHU SDWWHUQV LQ WKH
UHJLRQ￿ +RZHYHU￿ EHFDXVH WKH TXDQWLW\ RI ZKLWH PDL]H DYDLODEOH RQ D FRQVLVWHQW EDVLV IURP
RWKHU UHJLRQV RI WKH ZRUOG LV OLPLWHG￿ LW LV VWLOO LPSRUWDQW WR H[SORUH XQH[SORLWHG RSSRUWXQLWLHV
IRU PHHWLQJ UHVLGXDO ZKLWH PDL]H UHTXLUHPHQWV ZLWKLQ WKH UHJLRQ￿
￿￿￿￿ 3ULFLQJ 7UHQGV
0XFK DWWHQWLRQ KDV EHHQ GHYRWHG WR DQWLFLSDWLQJ WKH IORZ RI DJULFXOWXUDO WUDGH LQ 6RXWKHUQ
$IULFD WKDW PLJKW RFFXU XQGHU UHJLRQDO FRPSDUDWLYH DGYDQWDJH ￿YDQ 5RR\HQ HW DO ￿￿￿￿￿
.LQJVEXU\ ￿￿￿￿￿ .RHVWHU ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7KH FRQFHSW RI FRPSDUDWLYH DGYDQWDJH LQYROYHV PDQ\
IDFWRUV￿ FRQVXPHU SUHIHUHQFHV￿ WHFKQRORJ\￿ IDFWRU HQGRZPHQWV￿ WUDQVDFWLRQV FRVWV￿ DQG WKH
UXOHV XQGHUO\LQJ PDUNHW H[FKDQJH WKDW GHWHUPLQH FRVWV ￿%URPOH\ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 7KHVH IDFWRUV DUH
VRPHZKDW SROLF\￿GULYHQ￿ )RU H[DPSOH￿ SROLF\ LQ 6RXWKHUQ $IULFD KDYH FOHDUO\ VKDSHG ODERU
IORZV DQG FRVWV￿ PDL]H GHPDQG SDWWHUQV￿ DQG WHFKQRORJ\ LQYHVWPHQW LQ DJULFXOWXUH￿ ,W LV
TXHVWLRQDEOH￿ WKHUHIRUH￿ WKDW WKHUH LV VRPH REMHFWLYH XQGHUO\LQJ VWUXFWXUH RI FRVWV DQG
SUHIHUHQFHV WKDW FDQ EH XVHG DV WKH EDVLV WR GHWHUPLQH FRPSDUDWLYH DGYDQWDJH￿
￿￿ $Q
H[DPLQDWLRQ RI KLVWRULFDO UHODWLYH SULFH WUHQGV EHWZHHQ FRXQWULHV LQ 6RXWKHUQ $IULFD LV QRW
OLNHO\ WR JLYH DQ DFFXUDWH YLHZ RI IXWXUH WUDGH IORZV LI WKH VWUXFWXUH RI WKH PDUNHWV FKDQJHV
VLJQLILFDQWO\￿ +RZHYHU￿ D FRPSDULVRQ RI IDUP SULFHV DQG PDUNHWLQJ PDUJLQV DFURVV FRXQWULHV
SURYLGHV LQVLJKWV LQWR WKH SRWHQWLDO JDLQHUV DQG ORVHUV XQGHU D OHVV FRQWUROOHG UHJLRQDO WUDGLQJ
HQYLURQPHQW￿
)LJXUH ￿ SUHVHQWV WUHQGV LQ ZKLWH PDL]H SURGXFHU SULFHV LQ 6RXWK $IULFD DQG =LPEDEZH￿
GHQRPLQDWHG LQ 86￿ DW RIILFLDO H[FKDQJH UDWHV￿
￿￿ 6LQFH ￿￿￿￿￿ SURGXFHU SULFHV LQ 6RXWK $IULFD
KDYH EHHQ GHWHUPLQHG DV D IXQFWLRQ RI GRPHVWLF DQG H[SRUW PDUNHW FRQGLWLRQV￿ &URS LQSXW XVH
KDV GHFOLQHG DQG WRWDO IDFWRU SURGXFWLYLW\ KDV LQFUHDVHG LQ 6RXWK $IULFD15
7DEOH ￿￿ &RUUHODWLRQ &RHIILFLHQWV RI :KLWH 0DL]H <LHOGV %HWZHHQ 0DMRU 3URGXFWLRQ
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6RXUFH￿ &DOFXODWHG E\ DXWKRUV IURP GDWD IURP 0DL]H %RDUG ￿6RXWK $IULFD￿￿ &HQWUDO 6WDWLVWLFV 2IILFH ￿=LPEDEZH￿￿ DQG
+RZDUG ￿=DPELD￿￿
VLQFH WKH PLG ￿￿￿￿V￿ VXJJHVWLQJ LQFUHDVHG FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV RI 6RXWK $IULFD￿V IDUP VHFWRU
￿7KLUWOH HW DO ￿￿￿￿D￿￿ ,W LV DQWLFLSDWHG WKDW PDL]H SURGXFHU SULFHV ZLOO UHPDLQ QHDU WKHLU
KLVWRULFDOO\ ORZ FXUUHQW OHYHOV DV ORQJ DV ODUJH VXUSOXVHV RI PDL]H FRQWLQXH WR EH SURGXFHG DQG
H[SRUWHG DW D ILQDQFLDO ORVV￿ %XW D IXUWKHU GHFOLQH LQ H[FHVV FDSDFLW\￿ ZKLOH LQFUHDVLQJ WKH
OLNHOLKRRG RI VKRUWIDOOV DQG LPSRUWV￿ ZRXOG FDXVH H[SHFWHG SURGXFHU DQG FRQVXPHU SULFH RI
PDL]H WR ULVH￿
=LPEDEZHDQ SURGXFHU SULFHV￿ RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG￿ KDYH LQFUHDVHG VKDUSO\ VLQFH WKH ￿￿￿￿
GURXJKW WR UHVWRUH GRPHVWLF SURGXFWLRQ LQFHQWLYHV￿ )RU WKH SDVW WZR \HDUV￿ =LPEDEZHDQ
SURGXFHU SULFHV KDYH H[FHHGHG WKRVH LQ 6RXWK $IULFD￿ :KLOH LW LV GLIILFXOW WR SUHGLFW KRZ
JRYHUQPHQW￿GHWHUPLQHG SURGXFHU SULFHV LQ =LPEDEZH ZLOO HYROYH LQ WKH IXWXUH￿ VHYHUDO WUHQGV
LQ =LPEDEZH DUH QRWHZRUWK\￿ ￿D￿ PDL]H DUHD￿ ERWK ZLWKLQ WKH FRPPHUFLDO DQG VPDOOKROGHU
IDUPLQJ VHFWRU￿ KDYH GHFOLQHG VWHDGLO\ VLQFH ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿E￿ JRYHUQPHQW￿VXSSOLHG FUHGLW WR VWLPXODWH
VPDOOKROGHU SURGXFWLRQ KDV GHFOLQHG VWHDGLO\ LQ UHDO WHUPV VLQFH ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿F￿ WKH H[SDQVLRQ RI
*UDLQ 0DUNHWLQJ %RDUG EX\LQJ VWDWLRQV LQ VPDOOKROGHU DUHDV KDV DFWXDOO\ GHFOLQHG LQ UHFHQW
\HDUV GXH WR ERWK SRRU KDUYHVWV DQG EXGJHW FRQVLGHUDWLRQV￿ ￿G￿ UHFHQW OLEHUDOL]DWLRQ RI
=LPEDEZH￿V PDL]H PDUNHWLQJ V\VWHP ZLOO PDNH LW GLIILFXOW DQG FRVWO\ IRU WKH JRYHUQPHQW WR
FRQWLQXH RIIHULQJ SURGXFHU SULFHV LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK ORQJ￿UXQ PDUNHW FRQGLWLRQV￿ DQG ￿H￿ WKH
SURGXFWLYLW\ JDLQV DFKLHYHG E\ =LPEDEZHDQ VPDOOKROGHUV WKURXJK K\EULG VHHG DQG IHUWLOL]HU
DGRSWLRQ LQ WKH HDUO\ ￿￿￿￿V KDYH EHHQ ODUJHO\ H[KDXVWHG￿ $ QHZ WHFKQRORJ\ SDFNDJH16
Figure 2.  Maize Producer Prices in South Africa and Zimbabwe, 1987/88-1994/95
(especially one appropriate for semi-arid conditions where 60% of Zimbabwe's maize area is
situated) is necessary to appreciably reduce maize production costs.
Moving down the food system, there are at least two relevant margins in the official marketing
channel:  The first is the margin between the selling price and the producer price (which accrues
to the marketing board), and the second is the margin between the retail price of meal and the
selling price of maize (which accrues to millers and distributors).  The formulae used to
calculate these margins were:
Marketing Board margin:  PS - PP + S1
Mill-to-retail margin:  PMM/z - PS + [(z-1)/z]PB + S2
where PS is the selling price (price at which millers buy maize grain from the relevant marketing
board); PP is the marketing board's producer price, and S1 is the net trading loss per tonne of     
12These values are clearly shaped by numerous policies and are not purported to reflect some underlying notion
of comparative advantage.
     
13The large-scale millers' monopoly on urban markets was due to the Grain Marketing Board's difficulty in
selling maize to households in small quantities, and the policy barriers on maize trade into urban areas, which thus
confined custom-milling to the limited quantities of maize grown on urban plots (Jayne and Rubey 1993).
     
14A more comprehensive analysis would need to account for the time cost for a family member to procure the
maize and wait in the milling queue (see Rubey 1993).
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maize handled by the Board, if applicable.  PS - PP + S1 thus represents the operating cost
required by the Board to handle one ton of maize.
PMM is the retail price of maize meal; z is the average extraction rate (i.e., tonnes of grain
required to manufacture one tonne of meal, 1.176 for both countries); PB is the value of maize
by-product per tonne of grain used for processing; and S2 is the direct subsidy given to millers,
if applicable.  The mill-to-retail margin thus represents the margin which millers, distributors,
and retailers receive for processing one ton of maize into meal and distributing the meal to retail
shops.  Both margins are expressed in terms of tonnes of grain handled.
These margins were added to the producer prices presented in Figure 2 to derive the total
financial value of maize meal in South Africa and Zimbabwe, i.e., farm price + marketing board
margin + miller/distributor margin (Figure 3).
12  Despite an unclear picture with regard to
relative farm production costs in the two countries, cost comparisons at the retail level are very
stark.  South African consumers and taxpayers paid about twice as much on average, over the
1987-1994 period, for commercial sifted maize meal (85% extraction rate, converted to US
dollars at official exchange rates) than Zimbabwean consumers.  The differences in retail maize
meal prices substantially outweigh differences in transport costs between Harare and a number
of major urban areas in South Africa.
The difference between maize meal costs in Zimbabwe and South Africa have become even
more accentuated since the decontrol of private grain trade into urban areas of Zimbabwe in
1993.  The decontrol of private maize trading has created a rapid shift in throughput from the
large-scale industrial milling firms (which previously had a virtual monopoly on the urban
market) in favor of the small-scale hammer mills.
13
Table 4 shows the evolution of costs for roller meal (produced by the large-scale commercial
processing firms) and custom-milled whole meal (produced by small-scale informal mills) in
Harare, Zimbabwe.  The data indicate that the real cost of roller meal has declined since maize
market reform in 1993, due to both favorable harvests in 1993 and 1994 and increased
competition from the informal milling sector.  Table 4 also shows that, for Zimbabwean
consumers, the monetary cost of purchasing maize grain and then custom-milling it at a local
hammer mill was substantially cheaper than the price of roller meal in 1993 and 1994.
14 
Therefore, for those consumers relying on informal hammer mills for custom-milling), the cost
of meal was actually lower than those represented for Zimbabwe in Figure 3.18
Figure 3.  Retail Maize Meal Prices in South Africa and Zimbabwe, 1987/88-1994/95
The major factor explaining the divergence in retail maize meal costs in the two countries is the
difference in maize mill-to-retail margin (Figure 4).  These margins in South Africa have been
about three times higher than the margins through a comparable official distribution system in
Zimbabwe, and over ten times higher than the margins charged by small-scale custom millers in
Zimbabwe.
Figure 5 indicates that, after retail maize meal prices in South Africa were deregulated in 1971,
the inflation-adjusted miller/distributor margin rose 80% between 1970 and 1980.  Price
deregulation of an oligopolistic maize milling and retailing industry led to increased maize meal
prices at least partially because of a failure to stimulate greater competition by removing major
entry barriers on small-scale milling and retailing.  Further licensing restrictions on small-scale
millers between 1985 and 1992 led to even higher milling margins.  Over the 1990-94 period,
milling margins in real terms have risen 60% above their 1970-74 average.  This is significant
since the miller/retailer margin in both South Africa and Zimbabwe accounts for about 50% of19
the total cost of maize meal to consumers.  Since 1992, there has been an increase in the
licensing of small-scale informal mills, which, if continued, may exert significant downward
pressure on maize processing and distribution costs, as it has in Zimbabwe since 1993.
These cost comparisons suggest that, while the direction of trade in maize grain would be
somewhat ambiguous, there are clear incentives for maize meal (especially maize meal produced
by relatively efficient small-scale mills) to flow from Zimbabwe to South Africa under the
existing domestic maize marketing system in South Africa.  Similar incentives may also exist in
Zambia, where it is frequently alleged that maize production costs are low relative to both
Zimbabwe and South Africa.
Table 4.  Comparison of Roller Meal and Whole Meal Costs in Zimbabwe, 1992-1994 
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* Cost of roller meal represented by retail price of meal plus direct subsidy to millers.
Cost of whole meal (custom milled) is the informal retail price of maize grain in Harare plus milling fee; the figures
used were:
1993: Z$16.50 per 16kg bucket maize grain plus Z$2.00 per bucket milling fee = Z$18.50 per 16kg bucket, or
Z$1,156 per tonne
1994: Z$20.00 per 16kg bucket maize grain plus Z$2.50 per bucket milling fee = Z$22.50 per 16kg bucket, or
Z$1,406 per tonne 
** Consumer price index, standardized for 1994, assumes 25% inflation rate in 1993 and 1994.20
Figure 4.  Mill-to-retail margins for manufacture of commercial
roller meal and custom-milled meal in US$ per tonne, South Africa
and Zimbabwe, 1987/88-1994/95
Figure 5.  Evolution of Real Mill-to-Retail Margins for Manufacture
of Roller Meal in South Africa, 1970-199421
However, numerous factors need to be assessed in detail before these results may be considered
useful for policy purposes.  The foregoing does suggest that the welfare of maize farmers in
South Africa is critically tied to the efficiency of its distribution and processing industries &
embodied in the margin between the producer price of maize grain and the retail price of maize
meal.  This discussion does not preclude the possibility that the South African maize processing,
wholesaling, and retailing industries earn only normal profits on their investments.  Yet their
margins are high compared to those in neighboring countries.  Under unregulated regional trade,
the relatively high marketing margins in South Africa are likely to depress the demand for South
African maize as trading firms would have strong incentives to satisfy the maize meal
requirements of South African consumers through cheaper foreign sources.  The strongest
incentives for importation of maize meal would be in the northern and north-eastern parts of the
country, where transport costs from northern neighbors are relatively low.  However, the
incentives to import maize meal may be largely erased if domestic market reform in South
Africa were able to reduce maize marketing costs and retail prices of maize meal for the
majority of South African consumers by the time that restrictions on private cross-border trade
were eliminated.22
Ait ￿ a0 ￿ a1 PMZ
￿
it ￿ a2 PSit￿1 ￿ a3 LCit (1)
4.  METHODS AND DATA
This section presents the econometrically-parameterized spatial-equilibrium model to simulate
the effects of alternative marketing policies for maize on production, consumption, trade and
pricing outcomes.  We present (a) the supply and demand functions and estimation procedure
underlying the model; (b) the structure of the regional spatial-equilibrium simulation model; (c)
data sources; and (d) limitations of the model.
4.1. Supply and Demand Functions
To distinguish between policy-induced and weather-related variations in maize production,
particular attention was devoted to the processes determining variation in maize area.  Area
cultivated is considered more representative of farmers' behavioral intentions than production. 
Although cultivated area is affected by weather, it is less subject to noise from stochastic yield
effects than either production or marketed output (Askari and Cummings 1976).  We
hypothesize that maize area is a function of the expected producer price of maize, input prices,
prices of the major substitute crop in production, and other "shift variables" known at the time of
planting and considered exogenous from the farmer's standpoint.  One such variable in South
Africa is land set aside under the Land Conversion Programme (LCP).  The intent of the LCP
has been to pay farmers for not planting maize, primarily on marginal land, in order to reduce
both environmental degradation and instability of maize production.  While the aggregate area
under the LCP can reasonably be considered exogenous to any individual farmer, estimates of
area under the LCP was reported by government before planting, and can hence be considered
part of the information set at planting time.
We also hypothesize that an important "shift variable" for maize area in Zimbabwe's smallholder
sector is the number of Grain Marketing Board buying stations accessible to smallholders.  The
expansion of market infrastructure to smallholders was a major feature of the post-independence
government's effort to expand maize production incentives (Rohrbach 1989; Amin 1990).
Letting i denote cross-sectional observations for region i, and t represents time periods ranging
from 1 to T, yellow and white maize equations for the nine regions of South Africa can be
expressed as:
where At is area planted in crop season t, PMZt
* is the farmer's expectation, at planting time, of
the producer price of maize that will prevail at harvest time; PSt-1 is the price of the major
substitute crop (either sorghum, sunflower, tobacco, or cotton, depending on the region); and LCt
is the quantity of land reserved under the Land Conversion Programme in each region.  All
prices were deflated by the farm input price index.
Expressing equation (1) in first-difference form yields:     
15The main exception to this was in Zimbabwe from 1976-1981, and in 1993, when pre-planting prices were
announced by the government.  In South Africa, there was a tacit understanding up until the mid-1980s that gross
revenue from maize sales, in nominal terms, would not fall below that of the preceding year.
     
16Note that the adaptive expectations model also can be viewed as a rational expectation model if it can be
assumed that X is stochastic and its values are generated according to the scheme Xt = Xt-1 + ut - ￿ut-1 where ut is a
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(5)
Over the sample period, farm prices in South Africa and Zimbabwe typically have been
announced after planting.
15  In such a case, it is not appropriate to model area as a function of the
producer price that will prevail in the next marketing season since this information is not known
at the time of planting.  For this reason, we model area in each region as a function of the
expected maize price that will prevail at harvest.  However, this price is not directly observable. 
One method for modelling expectations is to use lagged producer prices ("naive expectations"),
but this assumes that farmers disregard the recent history of maize prices in previous years and
form their expectations about the future price based only on the current price.  A more realistic
alternative is provided by the adaptive expectations hypothesis, which has been frequently used
in such cases to approximate farmers' price predictions (see Askari and Cummings (1976) for a
survey).  The adaptive expectations hypothesis models expected price in period t as a weighted
average of the price in t-1 and the expected price in 0period t-1:
where PMZ
* is the expected maize producer price in real terms, and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.  Such a formation
is based on the idea that current expectations are derived by modifying previous expectations in
light of recent experience.
16  Assuming that farmers in South Africa form their price expectations
adaptively, and then substituting (3) into (2), we have
Re-writing (1) in price-dependent form gives:24
Ait ￿￿ ￿a0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ait￿1 ￿ (￿a1)PMZit￿1 ￿ a2PSit￿1
￿ a3 LCit ￿ a2(￿ ￿ 1)PSit￿2 ￿ a3(￿ ￿ 1)LCit￿1
(6)
Ait ￿ %0 ￿ %1 Ait￿1 ￿ %2 PMZit￿1 ￿ %3 PSit￿1
￿ %4 LCit ￿ %5 PSit￿1 ￿ %6 LCit￿1
(7)
which is then substituted into (4) to give:
or, in reduced form:
where: %0 ￿￿ ￿a0
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%6 ￿￿ a3(￿ ￿ 1)
Short-run and long-run elasticity estimates can be obtained by recovering the coefficients from
the structural equation (1) for each region i.  For example, the short-run own price elasticity is
, while the long-run own price elasticity is simply  . %2 ￿ ￿a1 a1 ￿ %2 ÷( 1 ￿ %1)
Equation (7) was estimated simultaneously for both yellow and white maize across the five
major maize-producing regions in South Africa, in first-difference form.  First-differencing the
data controls for unobserved time-invariant regional differences (e.g., differences in soil
conditions or infrastructural development between regions).  The system of 10 equations were
estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE), which increases
estimation efficiency by exploiting information in the cross-equation error covariance matrix.  A
likelihood ratio test could not reject (at the .05 level) the hypothesis that all coefficients for each
of the six predetermined variables in (7) were the same across regions.
For Zimbabwe, first-differenced area equations for the commercial and smallholder farming
sectors are estimated separately using OLS due to presumed differences in farm structure and
behavior.
Production levels were simulated through a random weather variable, based on the distribution
of yields over the 1970-94 period.  This yield outcome is then multiplied by expected area
evaluated at the simulated values of the predetermined variables.  Estimates of marketed output
are then derived as a linear function of production.  Quadratic specifications were tested (based25
on the hypothesis that the proportion of production that is marketed may increase with
production), but the assumption of linearity could not be rejected at the 5% level in any case.
Next, demand equations for white and yellow maize were specified for the nine regions in South
Africa.  Two demand equations were specified for Zimbabwe, one for maize meal and one for
industrial uses (including stockfeed).  White maize is considered destined for human
consumption (primarily maize meal), while yellow maize demand has almost always been for
animal consumption, except during droughts.  Simultaneity between price and quantities are not
an issue because prices were controlled over the estimation period in both South Africa and
Zimbabwe.  Consistent with standard consumer demand theory, yellow maize and per capita
white maize demand in region i is specified as
(8)  DYit =  b0 + b1(PBit) + b2(PSYit) + b3(Yit) + b4(Dit) + b5(T) + vit
(9)  DWit =  d0 + d1(PCit) + d2(PSWit) + d3(Yit) + d4(Dit) + d5(T) + eit
where PBt and PSYt are the marketing board's selling price of maize and sorghum, respectively,
in region i; PCt is the retail price of maize meal (demand for maize by processors is a derived
demand for maize meal by consumers); PSWt is the retail price of the major substitute in
consumption (potatoes or wheat, depending on the region), Yt is per capita income in region i; Dt
is a drought dummy for region i (designed to capture shifts in consumption from white to yellow
maize during drought years); and T is a time trend to account for slow-moving omitted variables
such as changes in consumer preferences.  All monetary variables were deflated by the consumer
price index.  Equations (8) and (9) were first-differenced, again to account for the effects of
time-invariant regional differences.  First-differencing also has the effect of transforming the
time trend variable into a constant term.
The first-differenced yellow and white maize demand equations were estimated simultaneously
for all ten consuming regions, using SURE estimation.  However, a likelihood ratio test rejected
the hypothesis that the coefficients of these demand equations were equal across regions, and
unrestricted models were re-estimated for (8).  Likelihood ratio tests indicated that the major
source of parameter variation across regions was on the income (Y) and drought (D) variables. 
This is not surprising since some analysts have suggested that maize may be an inferior good in
some regions and a normal good in others (Elliott 1991; Sartorius von Bach (1993).  Also, the
degree of substitution of yellow for white during droughts does not appear to be uniform across
regions.  When the parameters on Y and D were allowed to vary regionally, a likelihood ratio
test could no longer reject at the 5% level that the remaining price coefficients were equal across
regions.  Thus, these partially-restricted forms were estimated for (8) and (9).26
4.2. National and Regional Maize Policy Scenarios
The direction of maize trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the welfare of
consumers, farmers, livestock feeders, and agro-industries in these countries, will depend greatly
on future agricultural pricing and marketing policies in the two countries.  These policies may
evolve in a number of ways.  For example, controls on domestic trade and pricing may be
abolished while still maintaining tariff barriers on private cross-border or international trade. 
Alternatively, governments may legalize private cross-border trade while still defending national
floor and ceiling prices through the continuation of state trading operations.  The evolution of
national maize policies may have important external effects on the operation of maize sectors in
other countries in the region.  This is particularly true of South Africa due to its size relative to
the regional market.
Four policy scenarios are simulated over the 1994/95-1997/98 marketing years:
Scenario 1: The existing system of government-controlled maize prices in South Africa and
Zimbabwe.  Maize Board prices are set at the following levels through the
four-year simulation period:
a. Maize Board selling price:  R505/t (white); R485/t (yellow)
retail/miller margin:  R1,085/t (white)
Zimbabwe GMB prices:  Z$900 (producer); Z$1,170 (selling price).
b. Maize Board selling price:  R505/t (white); R485/t (yellow)
retail/miller margin:  R814/t (white)
Zimbabwe GMB prices:  Z$900 (producer); Z$1,170 (selling price).
c. Maize Board selling price:  R575/t (white); R555/t (yellow)
retail/miller margin:  R814/t (white)
Zimbabwe GMB prices:  Z$900 (producer); Z$1,170 (selling price).
Scenario 2: Deregulated maize trade within South Africa, given 1993 controlled price
levels in Zimbabwe (as in Scenario 1).
Scenario 3: Deregulated maize trade within and between South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the
world market; and
Scenario 4: A protected regional market, i.e., Scenario 3 with alternative tariff levels on
imported yellow maize from the world market.     
17The hypothesis of stochastic yields was examined by regressing regional yields on a time trend and
maize/nitrogen fertilizer price ratio.  In only one region (Zimbabwe smallholder sector) was a time trend found to
be statistically significant; in no cases was the maize/nitrogen fertilizer price ratio significant.
     
18Retail maize meal prices and Maize Board selling prices for yellow maize were based on their average levels
over the 1990-1993 period.
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4.3. Structure of the Simulation Model
Results are simulated using a regional spatial-equilibrium model.  The model is essentially
structured as follows:  In each year, yellow and white maize area is predicted based on the values
of the predetermined variables in the area equations.  These values are updated in each
succeeding simulation year based on the simulated outcomes from the previous year.  Yields are
determined exogenously through a randomized weather variable.
17  For scenarios involving
controlled marketing and restrictions on private trade, each region is in autarky;  all marketed
supplies are delivered to the respective country's marketing board.  In keeping with current
arrangements in South Africa, producer prices in Scenario A are calculated as a residual after
average Maize Board costs (including domestic purchases and stockholding) are deducted from
average revenues (including domestic sales and export sales).  In Scenarios B, C, and D, maize
price, production, and consumption levels in South Africa are determined endogenously, based
on external trading possibilities, weather outcomes, and domestic marketing costs.
Maize selling prices to animal feeders (exogenous for South Africa in Scenario A and for
Zimbabwe in Scenarios A and B, along with the predetermined variables in equation (8),
determine stockfeed demand.  Analogously, maize consumers face fixed prices of commercial
maize meal (determined administratively under the controlled-price scenarios).
18
When trade and price controls are relaxed, prices become endogenous, and the model is similar
to standard spatial-equilibrium models where excess supply and demand functions are
determined from supply and demand conditions in the respective regions.  Equilibrium prices,
consumption, and production are simultaneously determined in each region, modified by
relevant transport and processing/retailing margins.  Finally, by aggregating across regions,
national trade flows and government budget outlays are derived.
Deregulation of maize trade in South Africa is expected to remove the major policy-related
barriers to entry in maize processing and maize meal distribution.  It is reasonable to assume that
deregulation would reduce the maize mill-to-retail margin to about the same level, in
standardized currency units, as those in Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Zambia after market reform in
those countries.  In these countries, market reform has stimulated new investment in small-scale
mills in urban areas for custom milling (Rubey 1993; Mulinge and Jayne 1994).  In response to
increased competition, the mill-to-retail margins in the official marketing channels have declined
in real terms (see Table 4 for information on Zimbabwe).  In the simulation scenarios involving
market reform in South Africa, we assume that the mill-to-retail margin will decline by 25%,28
from current levels of about US$450/mt to US$360/mt.  This is a conservative estimate of the
degree of margin reduction, as the current mill-to-retail margins for the large-scale milling and
retailing firms in Zimbabwe and Kenya are in the range of US$140 to US$180, about half that of
what we assume for South Africa under market reform.  Therefore, Scenarios B, C, and D
should be considered to provide conservative estimates of the benefits of maize market reform
for both producers and consumers in South Africa.
The world market is modelled as a residual supplier of yellow maize, with perfectly elastic
supply, and a vent for surplus production of both white and yellow maize.  However, due to high
domestic and international transport costs associated with exports, the export parity price is
considerably lower than historical domestic selling price levels in both South Africa and
Zimbabwe.  Due to unreliable and sparse data for other countries in the region, the remainder of
the Southern Africa region (Swaziland, Lesotho, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique) is
aggregated into one region, which enters the model as a importer of white maize, with a random
weather variable determining import requirements in a given year.  Whether this import demand
is exported from South Africa, Zimbabwe, or the world market depends on relative prices in the
two countries, and availability of white maize supplies.  In situations where neither South Africa
nor Zimbabwe have a white maize surplus, such as 1992, import demand for the rest of the
region is filled by yellow maize from the world market.
Modelling the Land Conversion Programme in South Africa is difficult because the quantity of
land set aside by farmers cannot reasonably be considered a constant, but rather fluctuates with
evolving supply and demand conditions.  Clearly, the downsizing of the maize sector has
narrowed the structural surplus between domestic maize production and utilization, and
therefore, the target area under the programme has likely been reduced.  Thus, the predicted area
under the land conversion program was modelled as a partial adjustment process with respect to
the previous years' net surplus (production minus consumption), with the hectares registered
falling as the country's net maize surplus falls.
4.4. Data
All price and quantity data from South Africa was obtained from the Maize Board and from
Department of Agriculture Abstracts of Agricultural Statistics.  Zimbabwean price and quantity
data was obtained from the Grain Marketing Board, Central Statistics Office, and the
Agritex/Early Warning Unit of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development. 
South African and Zimbabwean rainfall data was from the South African Weather Bureau and
from Masters (1994).  Inter-regional transport costs used in the simulation model were obtained
from the South African Department of Transportation.29
4.5. Limitations
Data accuracy determines the validity of economic prediction.  This is the case for both
qualitative and quantitative analyses.  The agricultural data for South Africa and Zimbabwe is
considered fairly reliable.  Data for Mozambique, Zambia, and the other countries in the region
were not considered reliable, and we refrain from estimating supply and demand equations for
these countries.  Rather, we treat these countries as a bloc, and simulate outcomes in South
Africa and Zimbabwe based on alternative scenarios about import demand for this bloc.  While a
full regional analysis would be desired, it was deemed that the data for the other countries in the
region could not support such an analysis.
Neither South Africa nor Zimbabwe's maize economies have operated under unregulated trading
conditions at any time during the estimation period.  While it would be preferable to predict
producer and consumer responses using data from the structural conditions being simulated, such
data obviously does not exist.  The unavoidable alternative is to use available knowledge of
agent behaviors and operating environments to make informed assumptions about how future
behavioral responses may differ from historical responses.  It is noteworthy to point out that this
problem arises for all ex ante analyses, qualitative as well as quantitative.  Here, we assume that
the price and income elasticities estimated under the 1970-94 period are the best available
indicators of expected farm and consumer behavior under a less regulated market environment. 
In the absence of observed behavioral information under the various alternative policy scenarios,
it would seem reasonable to view farm and consumer responses to price changes to be similar
whether those prices are generated from private buyers or the official marketing system, as long
as transactions costs do not differ greatly between the two sectors.
It must also be stressed that the model is partial-equilibrium.  For example, the effects of market
reform on farmers are assessed only insofar as they affect farm revenue from maize, and do not
capture the effects of maize market reform on changes in farm revenues from substitute
commodities.  Likewise, policy changes in the maize sector may affect variables outside the
sector that subsequently have feedback impacts on the variables of interest in the sector.  For
example, a change in the price of maize may be expected to change real income levels for some
consumers, although income is considered exogenous in this model.  A comprehensive general-
equilibrium model of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in the region was beyond the
scope of this analysis.30
5.  RESULTS
This section presents econometric results and simulation outcomes for the four policy scenarios
described above.
5.1. Econometric Estimation Results
Estimation results for the maize area equations indicate low short-run area response to producer
price changes (Tables 5 and 6).  At mean price levels, the estimates of short-run price elasticity
of yellow maize area were in the range of zero to 0.5, and were in all cases statistically
insignificant even at the 0.20 level.  At mean yield levels, this translates into short-run price
elasticities of supply on the order of zero to 0.65.  The negative and insignificant coefficient on
lagged maize area indicates very little additional response to price beyond its short-run effect. 
Supply response for the major yellow maize production regions, Orange Free State, Eastern
Transvaal, and Northwest are particularly low.
White maize area elasticities ranged from 0.08 to 0.61 in the main producing regions of South
Africa.  These estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.  Long-run responses are
slightly higher.  When evaluated at mean yield levels, the price elasticities of supply for the
major production regions of South Africa ranged from 0.10 to 0.78 in the short run, and from
0.15 to 1.0 in the long run.  For Zimbabwe's commercial and smallholder sectors, the short-run
price elasticities of area were 0.43 and 0.75, respectively.  These estimates are significant at the
5% level only for the commercial sector.  At mean yield levels, the short-run price elasticities of
supply were 0.60 and 0.95.
These results are consistent with the estimates of van Zyl (1991) and Wright and Nieuwoudt
(1993) for South Africa, and of Buccola and Sukume (1988) for Zimbabwe.  Inelastic supply
response is not surprising in these regions given the dominance of maize in both commercial
farmers' and smallholders' cultivation strategies, and very low area devoted to substitute crops
such as sorghum and sunflower.
The effect of the land conversion program in South Africa appears to depress production in the
short-run, but this effect appears to be largely offset within the second year.  Generally, the
program appeared to have neither a strong nor significant depressing effect on maize plantings
over the long-run.
Price elasticities of demand for white maize are generally significant and higher than price
elasticities of white maize supply (Table 8).  This implies, for example, that lower white maize
prices in the region would increase demand to a greater extent than they would reduce supply. 
Income elasticities for white maize were generally negative, indicating that maize meal is an
inferior good in the diets of most South Africans.  In Zimbabwe, white maize appears to be a
normal good.  The price of potatoes, a major substitute for maize meal, was positively and
significantly associated with the demand for white maize in South Africa, indicating that the
large supply variability exhibited by this commodity may introduce some31













































































































2 .24 .22 .53 .75 .28 .74 .69 .35
F-statistic 2.68 1.98 4.88 14.60 3.03 14.01 8.70 2.19
t-statistics in parentheses
Bolded coefficient estimates indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
Durban-h statistics were below the critical value for rejecting the hypothesis of non-autocorrelated residuals at the
0.10 level except for Northwest Province.
All prices are deflated by a farm-level input price index (1993=1).
PS is price of sorghum for Northern Cape, Orange Free State, Eastern Transvaal and Gauteng (former PWV
region); and is price of sunflower for regions Eastern Cape, KwaZulu/Natal and Northern Transvaal.
Source = regression results.32
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2 0.45 0.52 0.64 0.75 0.62 0.52 0.45 0.46 0.62 0.68
F-statistic 2.71 1.51 3.81 8.14 5.65 4.30 4.16 3.19 5.21 4.83
t-statistics in parentheses; Bolded coefficient estimates indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  Durban-h statistics were below the critical value for
rejecting the hypothesis of non-autocorrelated residuals at the 0.10 level except for Northwest Province and Eastern Province.  All prices are deflated by a
farm-level input price index (1993=1).  PS is price of sorghum for Northern Cape, Orange Free State, Eastern Transvaal and Gauteng region; price of33
sunflower for regions Eastern Cape, KwaZulu/Natal and Northern Transvaal; price of flue-cured tobacco for Zimbabwe's commercial sector; and price of
cotton for Zimbabwe's smallholder sector.  Source = regression results.34











































































































2 0.58 0.42 0.26 0.45 .60 .19 .65 .66 .38
F 3.01 2.80 2.93 4.81 9.17 2.28 11.18 11.86 4.92
DW 2.14 2.45 2.25 2.03 2.74 2.40 3.28 2.22 2.52
t-statistics in parentheses
Bolded coefficient estimates indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
All prices and incomes are deflated by the consumer price index (1993=1).
Source = regression results.35





















































































































2 .51 .49 .46 .55 .63 .75 .90 .88 .39 .70
F 4.88 6.30 5.90 6.12 10.00 16.87 46.64 39.63 11.45 11.58
DW 2.52 2.31 2.90 2.27 2.63 25.50 2.58 2.34 2.61 2.02
t-statistics in parentheses.
Bolded coefficient estimates indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
All prices and income variables are deflated by the consumer price index (1993=1).
Zimbabwe regression estimated separately with OLS.
Source = regression results.36
variability into the demand for white maize.  For example, in the populous KwaZulu/Natal
region, a 20% increase in the price of potatoes is estimated to increase the demand for white
maize by 11%, other factors held constant.  Finally, drought in South Africa tends to have a
negative effect on white maize consumption, and a positive effect on yellow maize consumption,
resulting from the processing sector's practice of blending yellow and white maize into meal
during years of white maize production shortfalls.  These results are consistent with those of
Elliott (1991) and Sartorius von Bach (1993).
For yellow maize, price elasticities of demand were also higher than for supply, but these
estimates were not statistically significant at the 5% level (Table 7).  The price of sorghum,
however, appeared to have a significant effect on the demand for yellow maize, presumably as a
substitute for livestock feed.
5.2. Simulation Results
Scenario A1:  Continuation of 1994 controlled marketing arrangements in South
Africa; fixed Maize Board Selling prices of white and yellow maize at R505 and R485,
respectively (in real 1994 R);
The scenario represents the status quo situation over the 1987-1994 marketing years.  With a
continuation in this marketing and pricing policy, the model results indicate that white and
yellow maize production, under normal weather, would be about 3.38 and 4.10 million tonnes,
respectively (Table 9).  This would result in maize self-sufficiency for both grains, under normal
weather.  The estimated self-sufficiency ratios are 1.14 and 1.04 for white and yellow maize.
However, despite surplus maize production, the model suggests that up to 800,000 tonnes of
maize meal from Zimbabwe could be profitably imported, given available surplus production
and price levels in Zimbabwe.  Incentives for importation of meal are confined to the northern
regions in South Africa (Northern Transvaal and Guateng), since high transport costs erode the
cost advantage of Zimbabwean meal for the other regions.  It is unlikely, however, that
Zimbabwe could consistently produce this magnitude of surplus maize, given its other export
markets, and due to the declining trend in expected maize production relative to consumption
requirements in Zimbabwe.  As explained in Section 3, Zimbabwean maize production per
capita has declined for the past decade due to a shift out of maize production by commercial
farmers into non-regulated crops, declining outlays of government credit to smallholders,
stagnant fertilizer use, inability of the private and public agricultural research system to generate
new hybrid seeds to promote productivity growth by smallholders (smallholders continue to use
hybrids that are 20 years old), and a modest withdrawal of Grain Marketing Board infrastructure
in smallholder areas.  While higher controlled maize prices in Zimbabwe could raise production
to some extent, this would in turn erode the competitiveTable 9.  Simulation Results:  Estimated Maize Performance Outcomes in South Africa under Alternative Policy Scenarios,
Normal Weather
Policy Scenarios:
(A) Status quo situation:  Controlled selling prices, internal and external trade in South Africa; 1993/94 price levels in Zimbabwe.
(B) Deregulated maize trade and pricing within South Africa; continuation of external trade barriers, and 1993/94 price levels in Zimbabwe.
(C) Deregulated maize trade within and between South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the world market.
(D) Protected regional market, i.e., Scenario 3 with a 15% tariff levels on imported yellow maize from the world market.
Scenario A B C D
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South Africa price setting (R/t) 
     white maize selling price:
     yellow maize selling price:
     wh. maize mill/retail margin:

























                                                                           ---------------------------------------------  simulation outcomes --------------------------------------
White maize production
(million tons) 3.38 3.49 3.61 3.43 3.51 3.51
White maize producer/selling price
(R/ton)
344/505 374/505 410/575 330/456 359/490 358/489
White maize gross revenue
(mill. Rand) 1,163 1,306 1,480 1,132 1,260 1,257
Retail price of roller meal
(R/ton)
1,590 1,319 1,389 1,301 1,289 1,289
Self-sufficiency ratio, white maize (%)
* 1.14 1.01 1.08 .98 1.04 1.04
Yellow maize production
(mill. Tons) 4.10 4.10 4.26 3.75 3.55 3.74
Yellow maize producer/selling price
(R/ton)
330/485 330/485 357/555 359/498 340/469 356/501
Yellow maize gross revenue
(mill. Rand) 1,353 1,353 1,589 1,346 1,207 1,331
Self-sufficiency ratio,
 yellow maize (%)
* 1.04 1.04 1.12 .98 .86 .98
note:  monetary figures are in constant 1994 Rand.38
* self-sufficiency ratio is defined as:  Production/Consumption*100.  A value greater than one indicates the degree to which domestic production exceeds
consumption (exportable surplus), while a value less than one represents the degree to which domestic production fills total consumption requirements (net
deficit).39
Table 10.  Estimated Maize and Maize Meal Prices under Free Trade (Scenario C) Relative
to the Existing System (Scenario A1), Normal Weather
White Maize
Producer Price   Roller Meal Price
Yellow Maize
Producer Price  Selling Price
-------------- Rand/tonne (% change from 1994 prices) ------------
Western Cape 396 (+16%) 1,332 (-14%) 348 (+ 5%) 425 (-12%)
Northern Cape 324 (- 4%) 1,260 (-19%) 291 (-12%) 387 (-20%)
Orange Free State 347 (+ 2%) 1,270 (-18%) 332 (+ 1%) 428 (-12%)
Eastern Cape 374 (+10%) 1,310 (-15%) 346 (+ 5%) 432 (-11%)
KwaZulu/Natal 378 (+11%) 1,294 (-17%) 343 (+ 4%) 419 (-14%)
Eastern Transvaal 354 (+ 4%) 1,278 (-18%) 340 (+ 3%) 446 (- 8%)
Northern Transvaal 379 (+11%) 1,301 (-16%) 333 (- 2%) 450 (- 7%)
Gauteng 361 (+ 6%) 1,285 (-17%) 362 (+ 9%) 472 (- 2%)
Northwest  329 (- 3%) 1,267 (-18%) 340 (+ 3%) 452 (- 7%)
source:  simulation model results
advantage of Zimbabwean exports and exacerbate the operating deficits of the Grain Marketing
Board.
Therefore, it appears that, while substantial incentives currently exist for profitable trade in
maize meal from Zimbabwe to South Africa under a deregulated external trading environment,
numerous factors may in fact impede this from occurring:  (a) continuation of controls or tariffs
on cross-border trade; (b) insufficient exportable surpluses of white maize in Zimbabwe; and (c)
progressive deregulation of maize milling and distribution in South Africa, which is anticipated
to reduce marketing costs and thus reduce the cost advantage of Zimbabwean maize meal.  This
issue is examined further below.40
Scenario A2:  Continuation of existing controlled marketing arrangements in South
Africa; fixed Maize Board Selling price of white maize at R505 (in real 1994 R); and
reduction in white maize mill-to-retail margins by 25%.
The estimated impacts of this scenario, relative to the existing regional market situation, are
shown by comparing Column A2 with A1 in Table 9.  The major simulated change is a 25%
reduction in maize processing/retailing costs that may arise from increased competition and
decentralization of downstream stages of the maize marketing system associated with
deregulated private trade.
Lower mill-to-retail margins simultaneously reduce average consumer prices of maize meal by
19% and increases average producer maize prices by 8.7% (from R344/t to R374/t).  This leads
to a 17% increase in consumption but only a 3% increase in production.  The large increase in
consumption relative to production is due to both a larger change in the consumer price than in
the producer price, and because of substantially higher estimates of price elasticity of demand
than price elasticity of supply for white maize.  Therefore, the white maize self-sufficiency ratio
(average production divided by average consumption) falls from 1.14 to 1.01, implying a greater
frequency of imports during poor seasons.  However, gross farm revenue from white maize rises
by 12% due to both higher maize prices and marginally higher production levels.  These results
indicate that South African white maize producers have a stake in reducing costs in the maize
milling/wholesaling/retailing sectors, as this would directly increase domestic demand, reduce
the level of grain sold on low-realization export markets, and hence increase producer price
levels.
Scenario A3:  Continuation of existing controlled marketing arrangements in South
Africa; reduction in white maize milling/distribution margins by 25%; Maize Board
Selling Price increased by R70 for white and yellow maize.
The effects of this scenario, relative to the status quo, can be seen by comparing Columns A3
with A1.  The white maize price, which is expected to rise by 8.7% when maize processing/retail
margins are reduced (A1 to A2), rises an additional 9.6% from R374 to R410 in Scenario A3. 
This is an increase of only R36/t even though the selling price is raised by R70/t, i.e., not all of
the increase in the selling price is passed through to farmers.  This is because the increase in the
Maize Board selling price depresses demand slightly, increases output, and increases surplus
production that has a relatively low export realization, and thus attenuates the increase in the
producer price relative to the increase in the selling price.  This highlights a key feature of the
existing pricing and marketing system in South Africa:  Attempts to raise the Maize Board's
selling price for white maize will result in only a partial pass-through to farmers.  About half of
the additional revenue generated by the Maize Board from higher domestic maize selling prices
is required to finance the Board's export losses.  A progressively smaller fraction of an increase
in the Maize Board selling price is passed through to farmers as the selling price further exceeds
export parity.41
Moreover, the increase in the selling price detrimentally affects consumers.  A R70/t increase in
the selling price of white maize is estimated to raise maize meal prices by an average of 5%.
A similar process occurs for yellow maize.  Higher Maize Board selling prices are not totally
passed through to farmers, because the resulting rise in production and lower quantity demanded
generates a higher exportable surplus.  Yellow maize exports generally fetch a lower average
price than domestic sales.  Thus, a rise in exports tends to depress the average realization from
yellow maize sales by the Maize Board.
The self-sufficiency ratio rises to 1.11, reflecting a greater buffer against the need for imports. 
However, with an efficient and widely-traded world market for yellow maize, the rationale for
self-sufficiency at higher-than import-parity prices is questionable.  The increased income for
maize farmers is outweighed by the increased expenditures on maize by consumers.  This
scenario, relative to Scenario A2, transfers income from livestock producers and consumers to
yellow maize farmers.
Scenario B:  Free trade within South Africa; continued barriers on private import of
yellow maize from world market; continuation of external trade barriers and 1993/94
price levels in Zimbabwe.
Unregulated domestic maize trade in South Africa (Column B) is estimated to depress producer
prices and gross farm revenue from white maize production in South Africa by 4% and 3%,
respectively, compared to the existing system.  Retail prices also fall, reflecting assumed lower
marketing costs from competition, and lower producer prices.  This scenario represents a net
transfer of income from farmers and large milling firms to consumers, when compared to the
status quo system.  These findings are consistent with Wright and Nieuwoudt (1993), who also
concluded that consumers (farmers) would benefit (lose) under a transition to border pricing. 
Wright and Nieuwoudt further conclude that the gains to consumers under deregulated pricing
would outweigh the loss to farmers, resulting in a net gain in total welfare.
Price policy in Zimbabwe appears to have only a marginal impact on market conditions in South
Africa.  The data presented for Scenario B in Table 9 assumes continuation of 1993 price policy
conditions in Zimbabwe, (i.e., Z$900/t producer price), which in the past two years has resulted
in excess supply and large government stock accumulation.  But even when higher controlled
prices in Zimbabwe are simulated in the model, the level of surplus production is not large
enough, relative to the size of the South African market, to have more than a slight depressing
effect on South African prices.  However, when combined with a one-standard deviation
increase in weather-induced yields in the region, import demand in the Southern Africa region
contracts sharply, and both South Africa and Zimbabwe have large surpluses.  This is estimated
to greatly depress export realizations in both countries, and/or cause large stockpiling costs that
exert downward pressure on future prices.  If, on the other hand, Zimbabwe's Grain Marketing
Board's maize producer price were reduced by 20%, the model estimates that this would create a
small (1.6%) increase in white maize prices in South Africa.42
A major implication of these results is that if policy makers in either country set maize producer
prices at levels in excess of those required for maize self-sufficiency, the resulting surpluses will
require greater treasury support for exports both in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  This is because
a higher exportable surplus in either country will, other factors held constant, increase the
region's export supply relative to import demand and exert downward pressure on regional maize
prices.  However, this may not necessarily apply if there were cooperation or collusion between
the two countries in determining white maize exports to the region.
Scenario C:  Free trade within and between South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the world
market.
The major effect here is on the yellow maize market.  Cheaper imports fill about 15% of total
yellow maize consumption in South Africa, mainly in the coastal regions.  This has a depressing
effect on domestic production, but actually involves a 3% increase in producer prices relative to
current conditions because the elimination of surplus capacity also eliminates the problem of
surplus disposal at low prices on export markets.  However, this scenario is estimated to create
an 11% decline in gross farm revenue from yellow maize, compared to the estimated results for
the continuation of status quo policy (A1).
The model estimates that white maize producers will be moderately better-off under free trade
than under the current regime.  Average white maize prices would rise by an average of 6%
relative to 1994 prices from the existing controlled pricing system, partially due to an assumed
decline in marketing costs associated with increased competition, an increase in domestic
demand, and a reduction in exports with low average realizations.  Consumers gain considerably
under free trade compared to the current situation, assuming that the milling, wholesaling, and
retailing stages of the system are successfully deregulated to stimulate competition.
Milling/distribution costs in South Africa have already declined somewhat, partly in response to
the relaxation of licensing restrictions on small-scale millers, and removal of restrictions on the
purchasing of maize directly from producers since 1992/93.  These declines in cost and selling
prices of white maize are, to some extent, already visible in Figures 2 and 3.  Indications are that
the number of small-scale milling operations are increasing rapidly in South Africa, particularly
in rural areas. While their present market share is small (<10 percent), they do compete with
larger millers, distributors and retailers, resulting in lower consumer prices for maize meal in
these areas.
While the discussion above is based on average prices, a free trade situation implies different
prices for the different regions in South Africa. The extent to which prices will differ between
regions, which is largely a function of transport costs, is shown in Table 10.  The results indicate
that producers in surplus areas facing relatively higher transport costs to major demand areas
will be relatively worse off than producers from deficit producing areas. On the other hand,
consumers in surplus producing areas gain relatively more than those in deficit producing
regions.  With the exception of Northwest Region and Northern Cape, the model results indicate43
that white maize farmers will receive higher prices under market deregulation than under the
controlled marketing system.  White maize consumers in all regions will benefit from market
deregulation.  Yellow maize farmers will also receive higher maize prices under deregulation,
except in Northern Cape and Northern Transvaal.  Yellow maize buyers in all regions of South
Africa are anticipated to gain from market deregulation.
Scenario D:  Protected regional market, i.e., 15% tariff on yellow maize imports,
otherwise free trade within and between South Africa and Zimbabwe.
A 15% tariff on imported yellow maize is sufficient to make domestic production competitive in
almost all regions, resulting in virtually no imports of maize.  With the 15% tariff, the self-
sufficiency ratio for yellow maize is estimated to rise from 0.86 to 0.98.  The model estimates
that yellow maize producers will benefit under this scenario when compared to free trade (C),
with transfers of income from consumers and the poultry/livestock industry, to yellow maize
farmers.
The effects of this scenario on the white maize market are small and insignificant when
compared to free trade (C).  The tariff on yellow maize also has no major impact on maize trade
between Zimbabwe and South Africa.44
6.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The direction of white maize trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa will depend on future
agricultural pricing, production and marketing policies in the two countries.  However, the future
regional trade situation is likely to be especially determined by the evolution of production and
market policy in South Africa, due to the size of its maize sector in relation to the rest of the
region.
The viability of South African white maize farmers is dependent on the efficiency of South
Africa's downstream milling and distribution system.  South African consumer markets for
maize meal may be increasingly filled (to a limited extent) by white maize produced and milled
outside South Africa, unless a lower-cost domestic marketing system evolves that can increase
the competitiveness of South African maize production, processing, and distribution. 
Model results indicate that, under the 1994/95 controlled pricing regimes in South Africa and
Zimbabwe, up to 800,000 tonnes of maize meal from Zimbabwe could be profitably imported to
the Northern Transvaal and Guateng, given the availability of surplus production in Zimbabwe. 
High transport costs would erode the cost advantage of Zimbabwean meal in other regions of
South Africa.
It is questionable, however, that Zimbabwe will consistently produce this magnitude of surplus
maize, given its other export markets, and due to the declining trend in expected maize
production relative to consumption requirements in Zimbabwe.  Maize production per capita in
Zimbabwe has declined over the past decade due to a shift out of maize production by
commercial farmers into non-regulated crops, declining outlays of government credit to
smallholders, stagnant fertilizer use, inability of the private and public agricultural research
systems to generate new hybrid seeds to promote productivity growth by smallholders
(smallholders continue to use hybrids that are 20 years old), and a modest withdrawal of Grain
Marketing Board infrastructure in smallholder areas.  While higher controlled maize prices in
Zimbabwe could raise production to some extent, this would in turn erode the competitive
advantage of Zimbabwean exports and exacerbate the operating deficits of the Grain Marketing
Board.
Therefore, it appears that, while substantial incentives currently exist for profitable trade in
maize meal from Zimbabwe to South Africa under a deregulated external trading environment,
numerous factors may in fact impede this from occurring:  (a) continuation of controls or tariffs
on cross-border trade; (b) insufficient exportable surpluses of white maize in Zimbabwe; and (c)
progressive deregulation of maize milling and distribution in South Africa, which is anticipated
to reduce marketing costs and thus reduce the cost advantage of Zimbabwean maize meal.
Exchange rate policy will also make a difference.  Given the current marketing structure in
South Africa and Zimbabwe, a relative devaluation in the South African currency of just more
than 30 percent will erase the incentives to import maize meal from Zimbabwe.45
The recent deregulation of maize marketing in Zimbabwe, featuring a rise in small-scale maize
milling activities in urban areas, appears to be a major cause of declining marketing margins and
retail costs of maize meal.  In South Africa, milling and distribution costs have already declined
somewhat, partly in response to the relaxation of licensing restrictions on small-scale millers,
and removal of restrictions on the purchasing of maize directly from producers in the last season
or two.  Indications are that the number of small-scale milling operations are increasing fast,
particularly in rural areas.  While their present market share is small (<10 percent), they do
compete with larger millers, distributors and retailers, putting downward pressure on consumer
prices for maize meal in these areas.  Continuation of these trends, and increased competition,
seems to be a key to greater efficiency and smaller milling/distribution margins.
Viability of South African yellow maize farmers is much more dependent on the external trading
environment and the domestic transport sector.  When no import restrictions or tariffs apply,
cheaper imports fill a portion (<15 percent) of total yellow maize consumption in South Africa,
mainly in the coastal regions.  This has a depressing effect on domestic production, but actually
involves an increase in producer prices relative to current conditions because the elimination of
surplus capacity also eliminates the problem of surplus disposal at low prices on export markets. 
However, there still is a decline in gross farm revenue from yellow maize (<12 percent),
compared to the current situation.  The adverse effects of trade liberalization on yellow maize
producers could be partially offset by efficiency gains in the marketing sector, particularly intra-
regional transport costs and storage rates.  Reduction in transport costs from the Orange Free
State and Transvaal regions to coastal areas where a significant portion of poultry feeders
operate would make domestically-produced yellow maize more competitive relative to imports. 
A major issue is therefore whether a deregulated private trading system would be expected to
reduce maize transport and storage costs compared to the existing system where such rates are
determined administratively by the Maize Board, the cooperatives, and Spoornet, the national
railway system.
The viability of local yellow maize farmers also depends on tariff levels and exchange rates
governing imports.  A tariff on yellow maize imports, or a relative devaluation in the South
African currency, of 15 percent will erase all price incentives to import yellow maize, given the
current market structure.
Consumers in general would be major beneficiaries of a deregulated and liberalized marketing
policy environment which leads to, among other things, lower costs of downstream milling,
distribution and transport activities.  Deregulation and liberalization of marketing would be
expected to stimulate competition, drive down consumer prices of both white and yellow maize,
as appears to have been the case in other countries in the region where the single channel
marketing system has given way to a multi-channel system.
This report concludes by highlighting several important conclusions for future policy
deliberation in the region:46
￿ Maize production has been stagnant or declining over the past 15 years in all of the major
maize producing countries in Southern Africa.  In per capita terms, maize production has
been declining in all countries.  This has been deliberate in South Africa since 1987, and
in Zimbabwe during the late 1980s, due in both cases to surplus production and related
export losses.  Yet in the other countries, falling per capita production represents
increasing reliance on South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the limited supplies of white maize
on international markets for residual white maize requirements.
Since 1987, South Africa has adopted a maize pricing policy designed to reduce treasury
losses to the maize sector.  In practical terms, this has involved lower average maize
producer prices and lower expected supplies for export.  If this trend continues, South
Africa's trade situation will become increasingly similar to the other major white maize
producers in the region, Zimbabwe and Zambia, insofar as it will fluctuate more
frequently from exporter to importer according to the weather.
The trend toward smaller expected surpluses in South Africa is particularly relevant in
light of the fact that weather and maize yields are highly correlated in the major
production areas of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.  First-differences in yields
give essentially the same results.  The emerging situation would suggest that droughts
and import requirements in one country would coincide with shortfalls in other countries,
even those that historically have been maize exporters.  In this potential regional market
environment, which would lack a consistent and reliable surplus maize exporter, it would
be reasonable to envisage that white maize self-sufficiency may become elevated as a
policy priority among other countries in the region, especially if the world market for
white maize remains thin.
￿ The welfare of South African white maize farmers is indirectly yet intimately tied to the
efficiency of South African maize distribution and processing system.  Currently, maize
milling-to-retail margins for commercially-produced meal in South Africa are over three
times higher than those in Zimbabwe.  Without efficiency gains in South Africa,
incentives would exist to import meal into parts of South Africa under a decontrolled
external trading regime.  Failure to reduce costs in South Africa's maize marketing
system is likely to depress South African farmers' maize output, farm prices, and share of
the South African maize meal market under a less regulated external trading
environment.  The major beneficiaries would be farmers and marketing agents in
Zimbabwe and perhaps other countries such as Zambia and Mozambique.
￿ Under a less regulated external and internal trading environment, the welfare of South
Africa's yellow maize producers will increasingly be tied to exchange rates, the level of
the tariff on yellow maize imports, and internal transport and storage costs.  Under the
existing structure of transport costs, and with no tariff, we predict that yellow maize
producer prices in South Africa would rise by 3% on average, but production and gross
revenue from maize sales would fall by 14% and 11%, respectively.  A 15% tariff on
yellow maize imports would be sufficient to make imports uncompetitive, but the same47
effect could be achieved without adversely affecting consumers and the animal feed
industry if reductions in transport and storage costs could be achieved.
These conclusions have important implications, not only for commercial farmers, but also for the
development of a Black smallholder farming sector in South Africa. The key issues in
adjustment of the maize marketing system, with respect to regional trade, are increased
efficiency in the milling, distribution and transport systems, tariffication and exchange rate
policy.  Policies affecting these issues will set the course for future maize trade and income
transfers in the region under freer cross-border trade.48
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